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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) in 19741 to address problems in the area of employee pensions
and benefits, with which prior federal enactments and complementary
1. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1982)) [hereinafter ERISA]. President Ford signed
ERISA into law on September 2, 1974. For a detailed guide to ERISA, see S. GOLDBERG, PENSION
PLANS UNDER ERISA (1976).
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state regulation had been unable to cope.2 ERISA established a compre-
hensive scheme that placed the regulation of qualified employee benefit
plans exclusively in federal hands.' The drafters of ERISA also sought
to reserve to the states the power to regulate areas in which they tradi-
tionally had primacy-most notably, insurance, banking, and securi-
ties.4 The drafters of ERISA thus attempted to carve out an area of
2. See infra notes 16-22 and accompanying text. In the introduction to the statute, Congress
stated:
[T]he growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit plans in recent years has been
rapid and substantial; that the operational scope and economic impact of such plans is in-
creasingly interstate; that the continued well-being and security of millions of employees and
their dependents are directly affected by these plans; that they are affected with a national
public interest; that they have become an important factor affecting the stability of employ-
ment and the successful development of industrial relations; that they have become an impor-
tant factor in commerce because of the interstate character of their activities, and of the
activities of their participants, and the employers, employee organizations, and other entities
by which they are established or maintained; that a large volume of the activities of such
plans is carried on by means of the mails and instrumentalities of interstate commerce; that
owing to the lack of employee information and adequate safeguards concerning their opera-
tion, it is desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, and to provide for the
general welfare and the free flow of commerce, that disclosure be made and safeguards be
provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and administration of such plans; that
they substantially affect the revenues of the United States because they are afforded prefer-
ential Federal tax treatment; that despite the enormous growth in such plans many employees
with long years of employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of
vesting provisions in such plans; that owing to the inadequacy of current minimum standards,
the soundness and stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits
may be endangered; that owing to the termination of plans before requisite funds have been
accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated benefits;
and that is therefore desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, for the
protection of the revenue of the United States, and to provide for the free flow of commerce,
that minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable character of such plans and their
financial soundness.
ERISA, supra note 1, § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1982).
3. See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text. Congress declared:
[T]he policy of [ERISA is] to protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to
participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect thereto, by es-
tablishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee ben-
efit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the
Federal courts.
ERISA, supra note 1, § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1982). Congress further declared that ERISA is
meant to:
[P]rotect interstate commerce, the Federal taxing power, and the interests of participants in
private pension plans and their beneficiaries by improving the equitable character and the
soundness of such plans by requiring them to vest the accrued benefits of employees with
significant periods of service, to meet minimum standards of funding, and by requiring plan
termination insurance.
ERISA, supra note 1, § 2(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1982).
4. ERISA, supra note 1, § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1982); see also S.
GOLDBERG, supra note 1, at 151. The drafters of ERISA wanted the statute to be consistent with
prior federal enactments that explicitly had established state regulation of these areas. In the field
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"exclusive federal concern,"5 while preserving state regulation of tan-
gential areas, so as not to create a regulatory void, nor to infringe on
state police powers.6
In an attempt to achieve this goal, the drafters of ERISA con-
structed an express preemption provision. Section 514 of ERISA deline-
ates the scope of the statute's preemptive effect on state law.7 Section
514(a) states that ERISA supersedes any state laws 8 to the extent that
they "relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) and
not exempt under section 4(b)." 9 Section 514(a), known as the "pre-
emption clause," is then qualified by a "savings clause," section
514(b)(2)(A), which states that ERISA is not to be construed as ex-
empting or relieving any person from any state law that regulates insur-
ance, banking, or securities. 10 The scope of the preemption and savings
clauses is refined further by the "deemer clause," section 514(b)(2)(B),
which states that employee benefit plans, or any trusts established
under such plans, will not be considered as engaging in the business of
insurance or banking for purposes of any state's law "purporting to reg-
ulate insurance companies [or] insurance contracts."" Thus, through
express legislative pronouncement, Congress attempted to define
ERISA's preemptive effect, giving the federal government broad regula-
tory authority over employee benefit plans, while reserving to the states
the power to regulate insurance. 2
of insurance regulation, the McCarran-Ferguson Act was the federal legislation that established
this congressional intent. See infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
5. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 524-25 (1981). One article has
observed that "[s]ince state law had previously regulated many aspects of such plans, ERISA in-
volved not only the creation of new law but the displacement of a large body of existing state law."
Hutchinson & Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 23, 34 (1978).
6. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (stating that there is a presump-
tion that Congress does not intend to preempt areas of traditional state regulation), cited in Met-
ropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740 (1985). For an important early article
that predicted many of the current interpretation problems and identified the complexities of em-
ployee benefit plan regulation under ERISA, see Brummond, Federal Preemption of State Insur-
ance Regulation Under ERISA, 62 IowA L. Rav. 57 (1976).
7. ERISA, supra note 1, § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1982).
8. Id. § 514(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (1982). "State law" includes "all laws, decisions,
rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law." Id.
9. Id. § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982).
10. Id. § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1982).
11. Id. § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1982).
12. Although ERISA's preemption provision appears on its face to be crafted carefully,
courts have had enormous difficulty interpreting its language ever since its enactment. At least one
commentator has argued that ERISA's preemption provision needs clarification through amend-
ment. See Manno, ERISA Preemption and the McCarran-Ferguson Act: The Need for Congres-
sional Action, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 51, 51 (1979) (arguing that the result of the uncertainties existing with
regard to whether employee benefits are provided through self-insured plans or by the purchase of
group insurance policies could be the complete termination of such plans, which would clearly
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Despite congressional attempts to elucidate an ERISA preemption
standard, it has been the courts that have been called upon to interpret
ERISA's preemption provision."3 This has led to wide debate regarding
the intent of the drafters, the underlying purpose of the legislation, and
ultimately, the essence of federalism. This Note will explore the scope
of ERISA's preemption provision as it conflicts with state efforts to reg-
ulate insurance, especially in light of the recent United States Supreme
Court decisions in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux'4 and Metropol-
itan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts.5 Part II provides a brief his-
tory of employee benefit plan regulation by the federal government
before ERISA. Part III examines the legislative history of ERISA and
its drafters' attempt to construct- an express preemption provision. Part
IV explores in detail the three parts of ERISA's preemption provision
and discusses several important cases interpreting the preemptive scope
of ERISA. Part V concludes that the Supreme Court has interpreted
fairly ERISA's preemption provision thus far, despite a lack of legisla-
tive guidance, by attempting to give meaning to all of its component
parts, while keeping in mind the fundamental purpose behind the legis-
lation. In order to bring uniformity and certainty to the field of em-
ployee benefit plan regulation, courts should not find a state insurance
regulation saved from preemption unless it is directed at the insurance
industry and regulates the activities of insurance companies acting
uniquely as insurance companies, but not as administrators or under-
writers of ERISA plans. This approach will maintain ERISA's integrity,
by following the plain language of the statute, while furthering Con-
gress's goal in enacting ERISA: bringing uniformity to the regulation of
employee benefit plans by making them exclusively a federal concern.
II. PRE-ERISA REGULATION OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, attempts at federal regulation of
administrative abuses of employee benefit plans had been largely un-
successful. The common law of trusts was inadequate to cover the com-
plexities of employee benefit plans. 6 The initial federal statutory
frustrate congressional intent).
13. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S.
724; Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
14. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
15. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
16. See Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 5, at 25-26. The common law of trusts possesses
both strengths and weaknesses in handling pension problems. ERISA's prudent business judgment
rule, for example, is really a common law trust rule that has been incorporated into the federal
statute. See ERISA, supra note 1, § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1982). The section provides, in
part, that an ERISA fiduciary "shall discharge his duties ... solely in the interest of the partici-
pants and beneficiaries ... with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
[Vol. 42:607
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response to employee benefit plan abuses was to regulate through the
use of the tax laws. Beginning in 1921, and culminating in section
401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Congress set forth a series
of requirements for plan qualification.17 This provision and others, how-
ever, could be avoided by employers who could afford to forego the tax
benefits of a "qualified" plan."8 The Labor-Management Relations Act
of 1947 (LMRA), although primarily concerned with labor-management
problems not directly related to pensions, set forth requirements that
affected employee benefit plans set up by unions.' 9 The LMRA's provi-
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character." Id. The "prudent man" approach provides
flexibility, while holding an ERISA fiduciary to the highest standard of care. The common law of
trusts approach is inadequate on its own, however, due to its shortcomings. See Hutchinson &
Ifshin, supra note 5, at 25-26. For example, while ERISA provides that a participant or beneficiary
may bring a civil action for enforcement of the statute's fiduciary obligations, beneficiaries suing
under the common law of trusts often had difficulty establishing the requisite interest and injury
to accord them standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty. See ERISA, supra note 1, § 502(a), 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1982).
17. I.R.C. § 401(a) (1982) (repealed 1986); Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 5, at 26-27. From
1921 to 1942, Congress passed several pieces of legislation that deferred taxation of employer con-
tributions to pension plans until benefits under the plan were finally distributed to its benefi-
ciaries. Section 401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 required that a "qualified" plan be
intended exclusively for the benefit of employees and their beneficiaries, that it not discriminate in
favor of shareholders, officers, or highly compensated employees, that it cover a minimum percent-
age of all employees, and that it meet minimum vesting and termination rules. Hutchinson &
Ifshin, supra note 5, at 26-27. A qualified plan entitled an employer to take immediate deductions
for contributions to it, while the recipient of benefits under the plan could defer taxation of the
plan's proceeds until they were actually received. Id. at 27; see also M. BERNSTEIN, THE FUTURE OF
PRIVATE PENSIONS 197-223 (1964).
18. Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 5, at 27.
19. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 302, 61 Stat. 136, 157
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1982)) [hereinafter LMRA]; see also Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note
5, at 27. The Act prohibited the payment of money, by an employer to a union or employee trust,
for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer, and their families and
dependents [unless] such payments are held in trust for the purpose of paying, either from
principal or income or both, for the benefit of employees, their families and dependents, for
medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or death of employees, compensation for
injuries or illness resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provide any of the fore-
going, or unemployment benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness insurance, or acci-
dent insurance; (B) the detailed basis on which such payments are to be made is specified in a
written agreement with the employer, and employees and employers are equally represented
in the administration of such fund, together with such neutral persons as the representatives
of the employers and the representatives of employees may agree upon and in the event the
employer and employee groups deadlock on the administration of such fund and there are no
neutral persons empowered to break such deadlock, such agreement provides that the two
groups shall agree on an impartial umpire to decide such dispute, or in event of their failure
to agree within a reasonable length of time, an impartial umpire to decide such dispute shall,
on petition of either group, be appointed by the district court of the United States for the
district where the trust fund has its principal office, and shall also contain provisions for an
annual audit of the trust fund, a statement of the results of which shall be available for
inspection by interested persons at the principal office of the trust fund and at such other
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sions, however, only applied to plans set up by certain unionized indus-
tries. Neither the tax laws nor the LMRA had the breadth necessary to
enforce fiduciary obligations imposed on persons in control of the
plans.20
Congress enacted the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act
(WPPDA) in 1958,21 requiring employee benefit plan disclosure and fil-
ing information. States, however, maintained their dominance in the
regulation of pension plans, insurance, and trusts.22 Thus, the WPPDA
did not go far enough in placing the job of regulating employee benefit
plans into the hands of the federal government.
In 1974 Congress sought to remedy employee benefit plan abuses
through an extensive regulatory scheme, ERISA. The congressional
purpose behind the new law was to ensure that benefits from private
pension plans were distributed to participating employees in accordance
with their credited years of service with their employers.2 3 ERISA pro-
tected participants in employee benefit plans by establishing fiduciary
standards, 4 requiring reporting of financial information, 5 imposing
minimum funding and vesting standards,26 requiring plan termination
places as may be designated in such written agreement; and (C) such payments as are in-
tended to be used for the purpose of providing pensions or annuities for employees are made
to a separate trust which provides that the funds held therein cannot be used for any purpose
other than paying such pensions or annuities ....
LMRA, supra, § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1982).
20. Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 5, at 27.
21. Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 301 (1958) (repealed
1976)); see Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 5, at 27-30.
22. Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 5, at 28-29; see also M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 47-
48. Professor Bernstein noted that "[t]he diversion of funds by speculation, overly generous com-
missions to favored companies (some in collusion with plan administrators), and other such ques-
tionable activities were the evils to which the Act was directed." Id. at 47. Professor Bernstein
recognized, however, the shortcomings of the WPPDA:
[The WPPDA's] method was compulsory disclosure and, initially, policing of practices by
those interested in the plans. But even effective disclosure was difficult to achieve because of
limitations placed in the law by the House committee. After a few years of frustration,
amendments were enacted giving greater powers to the Secretary of Labor to compel disclo-
sure and to check on the accuracy of the reports.. . . [Tlhe 1961 amendments added criminal
penalties for embezzlement, kickbacks, and conflicts of interest by plan administrators, who
must be bonded. However, the Act does not prescribe proper plan practices or provisions to
enhance the effectiveness of plans other than the protection afforded against criminal
conduct.
Id.
23. Highlights of the New Pension Reform Law, Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont.
(BNA) No. 763, at 5 (Aug. 29, 1974). See generally M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 17 (a seminal trea-
tise in which the author discusses the inadequacies of the pre-ERISA regime and proposes ways in
which its shortcomings could be addressed).
24. ERISA, supra note 1, §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1982); see also Brummond,
supra note 6, at 61-64 (discussing ERISA's provisions and summarizing their contents).
25. ERISA, supra note 1, §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1982).
26. Id. §§ 201-306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1086 (1982).
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insurance,2 7 and setting forth exclusive federal remedies for enforce-
ment." Because ERISA was the most far-reaching attempt at federal
regulation of employee benefit plans to date, and because the regulation
of employee benefit plans previously had been left largely to the states,
ERISA's enactment inevitably meant the displacement of a large body
of state law. 9
III. GENESIS OF ERISA's PREEMPTION PROVISION
A. Legislative History
Congress engaged in extensive debate over the scope of the pre-
emptive effect ERISA should have on competing state regulation. The
Conference Committee, in its report, considered but ultimately rejected
a preemption provision narrower than section 514,30 expressly stating
that section 514(a) was drafted intentionally to have a broad preemp-
tive scope." Proponents trumpeted ERISA's intended broad preemp-
tive effect in both houses of Congress. Representative John H. Dent,
House sponsor of ERISA, stated that "the reservation to Federal au-
thority the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefit plans" is
the statute's "crowning achievement. ' 32 Senator Harrison A. Williams,
Chairman of the Senate Labor & Public Welfare Committee, echoed
these sentiments, stating that ERISA's provisions were intended to pre-
empt the entire field of employee benefit plans for federal regulation.3
27. Id. §§ 4001-4402, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461 (1982).
28. Id. §§ 501-515, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1145 (1982).
29. See Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 5, at 30.
30. See supra text accompanying note 9. A more limited preemption provision stated:
It is hereby declared to be the express intent of Congress that ... the provisions of this Act
or the [WPPDA] shall supersede any and all laws of the States. . .insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to the subject matters regulated by this Act or the [WPPDA] ....
S. 4, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 609, 119 CONG. REC. 141-42 (1973) (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP.
No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4639, 4666 (set-
ting forth another early and more limited preemption provision).
31. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5162. The Conference Committee report stated that "the provisions of title I
are to supersede all State laws that relate to any employee benefit plan that is established by an
employer engaged in or affecting interstate commerce or by an employee organization that repre-
sents employees engaged in or affecting interstate commerce." Id.
32. 120 CONG. REc. 29,197 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dent) (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 29,933. Senator Williams stated:
It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the substantive and
enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are intended to preempt the field for
Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local
regulation of employee benefit plans. This principle is intended to apply in its broadest sense
to all actions of State or local governments, or any instrumentality thereof, which have the
force or effect of law.
Id. (emphasis added).
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The Conference Committee's report, however, merely paraphrased
the exceptions to ERISA's preemptive scope explicitly enumerated in
the text of section 514 itself,3 4 stating that "[t]he preemption provisions
of title I are not to exempt any person from any State law that regu-
lates insurance, banking or securities."3 5 Thus, despite Senator Wil-
liams's characterization of these exceptions as "narrow, 3 6 the report
provides little more guidance than already is present in the text of the
statute, which could account in part for the early confusion of courts
faced with the task of construing ERISA's preemption provision.
B. Judicial Interpretation: The Preemption Problem
In light of the dearth of legislative guidance 8 as to how the words
of section 514 should be read, courts could only look to the words of the
statute themselves.3 " Although Congress had expressed its intent in
making the area of employee benefits a federal concern, it also had been
unmistakably clear in stating that certain state laws were to be saved
from preemption. 0 Thus, there were limits to the scope of preemption
already embodied in the statute.
The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution authorizes
federal preemption of conflicting state law.4 ' Courts inevitably fell back
on fundamental preemption principles embodied in this clause to de-
velop a sounder doctrinal approach to ERISA preemption questions be-
34. Compare text accompanying note 9 with source cited supra note 20.
35. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5038, 5162. The report goes on to paraphrase the deemer clause as well, stating:
[T]he [statute] generally provides that an employee benefit plan is not to be considered as an
insurance company, bank, trust company, or investment company (and is not to be considered
as engaged in the business of insurance or banking) for purposes of any State law that regu-
lates insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment
companies.
Id.
36. See supra note 33.
37. Compare Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 571
F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978) with Insurers' Action Council v. Heaton, 423
F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976). See infra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
38. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text; see also Brummond, supra note 6, at 64-
65 (forecasting that because of the uncertainty as to the meaning of ERISA's preemption provi-
sion, extensive litigation would be sure to ensue before the exact scope of preemption could be
ascertained). See generally Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F.
515.
39. The plain language of a statute is always a good starting point, so good that the United
States Supreme Court has adopted a dictionary's definition of the phrase "relates to" in ERISA's
preemption clause. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 n.16 (1983) (citing Black's Law
Dictionary in stating that "relates to" means "having a connection with or reference to"); see also
infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
40. ERISA, supra note 1, § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1982).
41. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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cause of the lack of congressional guidance in interpreting ERISA's
preemption provision.42 The initial judicial debate on the preemption
question centered on whether ERISA preempted all state law in the
area of employee benefits, or only those state laws that came into direct
conflict with one of ERISA's substantive provisions.4" Some courts took
the approach that because there was some doubt as to the scope of
ERISA's preemptive reach, only those state laws that came into direct
conflict with one of ERISA's substantive provisions would be pre-
empted.44 They declared that the presumption is always against pre-
emption.'5 Other courts looked to the statute's legislative history and to
its wording and concluded that Congress intended for the federal gov-
ernment to oversee totally employee benefit plan regulation, leaving no
room even for state regulation that did not conflict with ERISA.46 Thus,
although courts initially attempted to apply broader and more theoreti-
cal preemption doctrines, they were faced ultimately with a matter of
statutory construction: how should ERISA's preemption provision be
read based on its wording and on its legislative history.




The first problem of statutory interpretation is the phrase "relates
to" in section 514(a).47 The preemption clause states that state laws
that relate to an "employee benefit plan," as defined in section 3 of
42. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (stating that when a field is
traditionally occupied by state law, a court should assume no preemption unless it is the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142
(1963) (stating that "federal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of
state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of the regu-
lated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so or-
dained"). Contra Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (framing the inquiry as whether the
state statute subject to possible preemption obstructs "the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress"). See generally Brummond, supra note 6, at 93-97 (pro-
viding an overview of the preemption doctrine in general and laying the foundation for its possible
application in the context of § 514 of ERISA).
43. See, e.g., Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980
(1978) (discussed infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text); see also supra note 30 and accompa-
nying text.
44. See, e.g., Insurers' Action Council v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976).
45. Id. at 924.
46. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978).
47. ERISA, supra note 1, § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982).
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ERISA, are superseded.4" Although some courts have struggled with the
question of whether the plan involved is an employee benefit plan49 to
which ERISA applies, the more frequently litigated question has been
whether the state statute involved relates to what presumably qualifies
as an employee benefit plan under ERISA.50 The meaning to be given
the phrase "relates to" is significant because it defines the initial pre-
emptive reach of the legislation, answering the question of how much
state law ERISA could displace. If read narrowly, the clause could pre-
empt only state laws that were targeted directly at employee benefit
plans and came into direct conflict with one of ERISA's substantive
provisions. 51 Some early interpretations of the preemption clause sup-
48. Id. § 3(1)-(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)-(3). Section 3 reads:
(1) The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "welfare plan" mean any plan, fund, or
program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by
an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was
established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their benefi-
ciaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care
or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment,
or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholar-
ship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit described in section 186(c) of this title
(other than pensions on retirement or death, and insurance to provide such pensions).
(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the terms "employee pension benefit
plan" and "pension plan" mean any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereaf-
ter established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to
the extent that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan,
fund, or program-
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination
of covered employment or beyond,
regardless of the method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the method of
calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of distributing benefits from the plan.
(3) The term "employee benefit plan" or "plan" means an employee welfare benefit plan
or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan
and an employee pension benefit plan.
Id.
49. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 107 S. Ct. 2211 (1987) (holding that a state stat-
ute requiring an employer, in event of plant closing, to furnish a one-time severance payment to
employees not covered by a contract expressly providing severance pay is not preempted by
ERISA, because it does not relate to an employee benefit plan, but to employee benefits); Bell v.
Employee Sec. Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan. 1977) (stating that a trust set up by
employer was not an employee benefit plan, and therefore was not governed by ERISA); Kilberg &
Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit Plans: An Analysis of ERISA
Section 514, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1313, 1319 n.27 (1984); Turza & Halloway, Preemption of State Laws
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 163, 187 n.136
(1979); see also Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp 316 (N.D. Ind.),
aff'd as modified, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977).
50. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Hewlett-Packard,
425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), af'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978).
51. See, e.g., supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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ported this reading.2 If read broadly, however, the preemption clause
could preempt any state law that had any effect on an employee benefit
plan, whether or not it conflicted with a substantive provision of
ERISA5
The reasoning behind these approaches, as well as more moderate
ones, centered around congressional intent in enacting ERISA, and gen-
eral principles of preemption, which control any federal intrusion into a
traditionally state-dominated field. Proponents of broad preemption ar-
gued that Congress intended to preempt totally the field of employee
benefit plans for federal regulation and that it would be inconsistent
with such intent to read the preemption clause narrowly." Their statu-
tory construction argument was that the term "relates to" should be
given a common sense meaning and that if Congress had meant to limit
the preemptive reach of ERISA, it would have done so with more limit-
ing language. An early case adopting this view was Hewlett-Packard Co.
v. Barnes.55 In Hewlett-Packard the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
found California's Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 197556
preempted by ERISA.57 The court looked to the wording of the statute,
buttressed by its legislative history, and concluded that preemption was
indisputable.5
At the other end of the spectrum, in Insurers' Action Council v.
Heaton,59 the Insurers' Action Council sought an injunction in federal
52. Id.
53. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
54. See Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Ind.),
aff'd as modified, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977); Hewlett-Packard, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal.
1977), aff'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978) (holding that employee
benefit plans could not be regulated by California's Knox-Keene Act, which purported to regulate
insurance, because of clear wording of deemer clause); see also Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud,
442 F. Supp. 695, 711 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (stating that "[b]y enacting ERISA, Congress created a
moratorium of indefinite length on the passage of health insurance laws").
55. 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978).
56. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1340-1399.5 (West 1979). The act regulated funding,
disclosure, sales practices, and quality of services and required that California health care service
plans be licensed by the state Commissioner of Corporations. Hewlett-Packard, 425 F. Supp. at
1297. The statute also sought to regulate self-funded plans. Id. See also infra text accompanying
notes 160-78.
57. Hewlett-Packard, 571 F.2d at 505.
58. Id. The court stated in part:
The clear wording of section 514 and the relevant legislative history show that Congress un-
mistakably intended ERISA to preempt a state law such as Knox-Keene that directly regu-
lates employee benefit plans. Although [the savings clause] exempts from preemption state
regulation of insurance, [the deemer clause] provides that employee benefit plans may not be
considered to be in the business of insurance for purposes of the exception to preemption.
Id. at 504 (citations omitted). In 1979 one commentator characterized Hewlett-Packard as "proba-
bly the strongest single judicial statement to date in favor of full preemption." Manno, supra note
12, at 66.
59. 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976).
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district court to prevent implementation of Minnesota's Comprehensive
Health Insurance Act of 1976,60 claiming that it was preempted by
ERISA.6 1 The district court refused to enjoin enforcement of the Com-
prehensive Health Insurance Act, construing the preemption clause
narrowly62 and stating that laws which relate to the substance of an
employee benefit plan, as opposed to the plan's disclosure and reporting
provisions required under ERISA, were not preempted.63 The court also
reiterated that ERISA's savings clause expressly does not relieve any
person from any state law which regulates insurance, saying that the
state statute must be in direct conflict with ERISA in order for the
preemption clause to take effect. 4
The Heaton court incorrectly stated that the general rule was sav-
ings of insurance regulation, with preemption being the exception. 5 In
construing ERISA's preemption clause as becoming effective only if a
state law came into direct conflict with one of ERISA's substantive pro-
visions, the court overlooked the broad language of the provision.6 This
construction, as later cases explained, clearly was inconsistent with
ERISA's statutory structure, wording, and drafters' intent.
2. Alessi and Shaw
The United States Supreme Court attempted to clarify this issue in
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan Inc.6 7 Alessi involved a New Jersey
statute that prohibited reducing pension benefits by an amount equal
to workers' compensation awards for which a retiree was eligible.6 8 The
60. MINN. STAT. § 62E (1986); see also Brummond, supra note 6, at 91-92 (discussing the
Minnesota act and its impact on employee benefit plans). The Act required that insurers offer to
Minnesota residents certain "qualified" policies, which provided statutorily mandated benefits.
Similarly, it required that employers who offer health care plans to employees make available a
certain type of qualified plan. The Act also established a state association whose function was to
offer policies to persons unable to obtain them otherwise, and to reinsure qualified policies issued
by individual insurers. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. at 923.
61. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. at 926.
62. Id.
63. Id.; see Manno, supra note 12, at 67.
64. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. at 926.
65. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
66. The court stated:
[ERISA's preemption provision] provides that with a very narrow exception, ERISA should
not be construed to relieve any person from any state law regulating insurance, banking, or
securities. Thus the conflict between the challenged state insurance law and ERISA has to be
very clear in order to trigger the preemption provision. The only substantive parts of ERISA
which relate to health and accident insurance are the reporting and disclosure provisions.
These requirements have nothing to do with the substance of the insurance plans which em-
ployers must offer their employees.
Heaton, 423 F. Supp. at 926.
67. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
68. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-29 (West 1988).
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Court held that ERISA preempted the New Jersey statute because it
eliminated a method for calculating pension benefits (integration) that
was permitted by federal law. 9 Although the Court did not address the
limits of ERISA's preemptive language, it stated that "even indirect
state action bearing on private pensions may encroach upon the area of
exclusive federal concern." 70 Thus, although this particular statute was
preempted because of a direct conflict with federal law, the Court inti-
mated that the state statute in question need not come into direct con-
flict with a substantive provision of ERISA in order to relate to an
employee benefit plan. 1
Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, 2 courts have given the preemption clause its definitive broad
reading. Shaw involved a New York statute that prohibited discrimina-
tion in employee benefit plans on the basis of pregnancy," and another
statute that required employers to pay sick-leave benefits to employees
unable to work because of pregnancy. The Court found "no difficulty"
concluding that the state laws related to employee benefit plans and
stating that the breadth of the preemption clause is "apparent" from
the wording of the section. 5 The Court cited Black's Law Dictionary
when it stated that a "[state] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan,
69. Alessi, 451 U.S. at 524.
70. Id. at 525. The Court stated:
It is of no moment that New Jersey intrudes indirectly, through a workers' compensation law,
rather than directly, through a statute called "pension regulation." ERISA makes clear that
even indirect state action bearing on private pensions may encroach upon the area of exclu-
sive federal concern.. . . ERISA's authors clearly meant to preclude the States from avoiding
through form the substance of the preemption provision.
Id. (citation omitted).
71. Id. This decision effectively overruled the approach taken by the district court in Hea-
ton, 423 F. Supp. 921. See Kilberg & Inman, supra note 49, at 1323-25; see also supra notes 59-66
and accompanying text.
72. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
73. N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 290-301(a) (McKinney 1982). The law was a comprehensive antidis-
crimination statute that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex. The statute provided in
part:
1. It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
(a) For an employer or licensing agency, because of the age, race, creed, color, national
origin, sex, or disability, or marital status of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to
bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate against such individ-
ual in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.
Id. § 296.1(a). The statute had been interpreted by the highest court in New York to include as a
discriminatory act treating pregnancy differently from other nonoccupational illnesses. Shaw, 463
U.S. at 88 (citing Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 41
N.Y.2d 84, 359 N.E.2d 393, 390 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1976)).
74. N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAW §§ 200-242 (McKinney 1982). The New York law required em-
ployers to pay sick leave benefits to employees unable to work because of nonoccupational injuries
or illnesses, including pregnancy.
75. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96.
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in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or refer-
ence to such a plan.''1 6 The Shaw Court stated that it was clearly Con-
gress's intent to give the phrase "relates to" a broad, "common sense"
meaning; therefore, no preemption analysis was necessary.77 The Su-
preme Court's decision in Shaw seems to have quieted, at least for now,
the question of what state statutes relate to an employee benefit plan
and are subject to possible preemption under ERISA.
B. Savings Clause
1. History and Purpose
The insurance savings clause,7 8 drafted in order that ERISA be
consistent with the McCarran-Ferguson Act,7 9 reasserted that state gov-
ernments, and not the federal government, would be primarily responsi-
ble for the regulation of insurance and insurance companies.80 Thus,
Congress intended to carve out an area of exclusive federal regulation
for employee benefit plans while leaving the general regulation of the
"business of insurance" to the states. The problem with this approach
is that the business of insurance and the creation and administration of
employee benefit plans overlap. This is most apparent in the case of an
employer who establishes an employee benefit plan by purchasing a
76. Id. at 96-97 & n.16; see also supra note 42.
77. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97.
78. ERISA, supra note 1, § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1982).
79. Pub. L. No. 78-238, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982)).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1982). The statute states that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be con-
strued to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulat-
ing the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance." Id. The McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted
following heavy lobbying by State insurance commissioners in response to the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533
(1944), which held that Congress, through its commerce clause power, could regulate the business
of insurance. Commentators and courts have agreed that the question of how much regulatory
power the states should have is a difficult one, and illustrates that the Act is not easy to apply in
practice. See, e.g., Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982); Group Life & Health
Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979); SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969);
SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959); Hahn v. Oregon Physicians Serv., 689
F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1133 (1983); Lowe v. Aarco-Am., Inc., 536 F.2d 1160
(7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Title Ins. Rating Bureau of Ariz., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1053 (D. Ariz.
1981), aff'd, 700 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1240 (1984); Lawyer's Realty
Corp. v. Peninsular Title Ins. Co., 428 F. Supp. 1288 (E.D. La. 1977), aff'd, 550 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir.
1977); Anderson, Insurance and Antitrust Law: The McCarran-Ferguson Act and Beyond, 25 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 81 (1983); Kimball & Heaney, Emasculation of the McCarran-Ferguson Act: A
Study In Judicial Activism, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 1; Manno, supra note 12; Comment, Group Life &
Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co.: The McCarran-Ferguson Act and Health Service Plans,
5 AM. J.L. & MED. 393 (1980); Comment, The Scope of the "Business of Insurance" Provision of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act: Virginia Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Vir-
ginia, 65 MINN. L. REv. 1187 (1981).
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group policy from an insurance company.81 The insurance company,
and consequently the plan, may be subject to a panoply of varying state
regulations, while the self-funded employee benefit plan is governed ex-
clusively by ERISA.s2 This inherent tension has manifested itself in
much of the litigation surrounding section 514.83
2. Wadsworth v. Whaland
Because of the apparent overlap of state and federal regulation, it
appeared that states could reach employee benefit plans, contrary to
the expressed intent of Congress, through the regulation of both the
activities of insurers who underwrite group policies purchased for those
plans and the content of the group policy itself. This "indirect" regula-
tion of employee benefit plans by the states was at issue in Wadsworth
v. Whaland. 4 In Wadsworth administrators of various health and wel-
fare funds, which provided coverage through the purchase of group in-
surance policies, challenged a New Hampshire statute, which regulated
the contents of such policies as being preempted by ERISA.s5 The
plaintiffs argued that ERISA preempted both direct and indirect regu-
lation of employee benefit plans.8 The First Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the New Hampshire statute did relate to, albeit indirectly,
an employee benefit plan and, therefore, was subject to preemption. 7
The court, however, found that the statute was not preempted because
it was a statute directed at insurers, which was saved from preemp-
81. The drafters of ERISA clearly anticipated that some employee benefit plans would be
insured through the purchase of group policies from insurance companies. ERISA defines em-
ployee welfare benefit plans as being established "through the purchase of insurance or otherwise."
ERISA, supra note 1, § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982); see supra note 48.
82. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985) (stating that
this distinction must be maintained in order to give life to the statute as worded by Congress and
that although such an interpretation clearly is contrary to the congressional goal of uniformity in
the regulation of employee benefit plans, only congressional action can change the statute).
83. Id.; see also Northern Group Serv., Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 85 (6th Cir.
1987), cert. denied sub nom. Northern Group Serv. v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 108 S. Ct. 1754
(1988); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas City v. Bell, 798 F.2d 1331 (10th Cir. 1986).
84. 562 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978).
85. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 415:18-a, 419:5-a, 420:5-a (1983). The statute required issuers of
group health insurance policies to provide coverage for the treatment of mental illnesses and emo-
tional disorders, something not required by ERISA. See also infra notes 102-12 and accompanying
text.
86. Wadsworth, 562 F.2d at 75-76.
87. Id. at 77. The court rejected a narrow reading of the preemption clause that would have
called for preemption only of state laws directly covered by ERISA. Id. The court noted that the
Conference Committee had replaced a narrower preemption provision with the present "sweeping"
language in order "to avoid 'the possibility of endless litigation over the validity of State action
that might impinge on Federal regulation. . .and potentially conflicting State laws hastily con-
trived to deal with some particular aspect of [employee benefit plans] not clearly connected to the
Federal regulatory scheme.'" Id. (quoting 120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits)).
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tion.85 Thus, Wadsworth opened the door for indirect regulation of em-
ployee benefit plans that utilize group insurance by regulating the
terms of the policies purchased by such plans. Wadsworth, however, did
not address directly whether the state statute in question was one
which regulated insurance; to the court, it was obviously one that did.
Later courts taking a closer look would not have the luxury of such an
easy determination.
3. Current Arguments
The wording of ERISA itself provides a strong argument that plans
which purchase a group policy from an insurance company should be
governed only by ERISA and not by state statutes that would otherwise
regulate the contents of the policy. Section 3 of ERISA states that an
employee benefit plan may be insured "through the purchase of insur-
ance or otherwise." 89 Clearly, the drafters of ERISA anticipated that
some plans would provide for the purchase of a group policy, rather
than self-insurance plans. Some courts, in concluding that a state stat-
ute involved is preempted, have held that when an insurance company
exclusively makes final claims decisions, ERISA, not state law, governs
the relationship between the insurance company and the insured.90 Un-
fortunately, section 51491 does not define what type of law it considers
as "regulat[ing] insurance." Various commentators 2 and courts9s have
proffered their own definitions; however, no consensus on a definitive
meaning has been reached. Prior to the decisions in Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts94 and Pilot Life Insurance Co. v.
Dedeaux,95 courts focused on determining whether the plan in question
was an employee benefit plan and, thus, was freed of state insurance
regulation under the preemption clause and the deemer clause, rather
88. Id. at 78. The court stated that to find the New Hampshire statute preempted totally
would read out the savings clause, something contrary to its duty "to construe [an act of Congress]
in such a manner as to give effect to all its parts and to avoid a construction which would render a
provision surplusage." Id.
89. ERISA, supra note 1, § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1982); see supra note 48.
90. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (calling this conclusion "indisputable").
91. ERISA, supra note 1, § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982).
92. See, e.g., Brummond, supra note 6, at 122-24; Okin, Preemption of State Insurance Reg-
ulation by ERISA, 13 FORUM 652, 672-78 (1978); Comment, ERISA Preemption and Indirect Reg-
ulation of Employee Welfare Plans Through State Insurance Laws, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1536
(1978).
93. See, e.g., Wayne Chem., Inc. v. Columbus Agency Serv. Corp., 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir.
1977); Providence v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F. Supp. 388 (E.D. Cal. 1981); Eversole v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 500 F. Supp. 1162 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
94. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
95. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
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than determining whether the statute involved was one that regulated
insurance and, therefore, was saved from preemption. 6
The most compelling argument in favor of a broad reading of the
savings clause is the plain wording of the statute. If the drafters of
ERISA had intended the statute to displace all state regulation of em-
ployee benefit plans, direct and indirect, they would not have inserted a
clear intention that state regulation of insurance is to be saved from
preemption. Without the savings clause, the only state insurance stat-
utes that would survive ERISA would be those that did not relate to an
employee benefit plan and, therefore, were not preempted. If this was
Congress's goal, it could have been achieved more easily by one sweep-
ing preemption clause, rather than a preemption clause qualified by
both a savings clause and a deemer clause.
An approach courts could use to delineate the scope of the preemp-
tion and savings clauses is to divide state regulation of group insurance
into distinct categories. The National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners (NAIC) has offered some guidance in this area, 7 categorizing
state regulation as: (1) laws that relate to the corporate and financial
structure of companies issuing insurance, (2) laws that relate to the sell-
ing of insurance contracts, such as statutes governing the licensing of
agents and the setting of rates, and (3) laws that relate to the contract
of insurance itself, such as mandated-benefits statutes.9 8 State laws fall-
ing into the first two categories would not be preempted by ERISA be-
cause they neither regulate the "terms and conditions" of the plan,e9
nor arguably relate to an employee benefit plan.100 State regulation fall-
ing into the third category, however, involves the "inexorable intersec-
tion of insurance benefits and employee benefit plans."' 0'1 Employee
benefit plans that are insured through the purchase of group policies
96. Following Metropolitan Life and Pilot Life, a three-step analysis, which tracks the lan-
guage of § 514, became the accepted manner by which to approach an ERISA preemption ques-
tion. See infra notes 102-60 and accompanying text.
97. See Manno, supra note 12, at 57-58 (citing NATONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMIS-
SIONERS, STATEMENT ON FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE INSURANCE REGULATION OF ERISA 17-19
(1976)); see also Brummond, supra note 6, at 81-84 (discussing the NAIC categories of insurance
regulation and how these types of insurance regulation affect employee benefit plans).
98. See Manno, supra note 12, at 57-58.
99. See id. at 53, 58; ERISA, supra note 1, § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982); see also SEC
v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459-60 (1969) (stating that the business of insurance for the
purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not include all the activities of insurance companies,
such as mergers and acquisitions, stock sales, and general corporate business activities, but is lim-
ited to "[t]he relationship between insurer and insured, the type of policy which could be issued,
its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement").
100. ERISA, supra note 1, § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982). Arguably, however, in light of
the expansive reading given to the preemption clause following Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S.
85 (1983), it is difficult to conceive of a state law that does not relate to an employee benefit plan.
101. Manno, supra note 12, at 58.
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rather than self-insuring inevitably will be subject to state laws gov-
erning the content of those policies. It is this broad category of state
regulation that has given courts the most trouble.
4. Metropolitan Life and Pilot Life
The Supreme Court finally defined the scope of the savings clause
when it addressed the question of whether state mandated-benefit laws
were preempted by ERISA. In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Mas-
sachusetts,10 2 a Massachusetts statute required the provision of certain
minimum mental health care benefits to in-state residents who were in-
sured under general insurance policies, accident or sickness insurance
policies, or employee health-care plans that covered hospital and surgi-
cal expenses.103 Metropolitan issued group health policies for employee
benefit plans and to employers and unions which employed and repre-
sented employees living in Massachusetts; but Metropolitan failed to
provide the benefits mandated by the statute. Metropolitan claimed
that the statute was inapplicable to any group policy issued for an
ERISA plan within Massachusetts because it was preempted by
ERISA's preemption clause. 10 Massachusetts argued that ERISA's sav-
ings clause saved the statute from preemption because it was a law that
regulates insurance. 0 5
The Court found that the savings clause saved the statute from
102. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
103. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47B (West Supp. 1985). The Massachusetts statute
provided:
Any blanket or general policy of insurance. . . or any policy of accident and sickness insur-
ance . . . or any employees' health and welfare fund which provides hospital expense and
surgical expense benefits and which is promulgated or renewed to any person or group of
persons in this commonwealth ... shall, provide benefits for expense of residents of the com-
monwealth covered under any such policy or plan, arising from mental or nervous conditions
as described in the standard nomenclature of the American Psychiatric Association which are
at least equal to the following minimum requirements:
(a) In the case of benefits based upon confinement as an inpatient in a mental hospital
... the period of confinement for which benefits shall be payable shall be at least sixty days
in any calendar year ....
(b) In the case of benefits based upon confinement as an inpatient in a licensed or accred-
ited general hospital, such benefits shall be no different than for any other illness.
(c) In the case of outpatient benefits, these shall cover, to the extent of five hundred
dollars over a twelve-month period, services furnished (1) by a comprehensive health service
organization, (2) by a licensed or accredited hospital (3) or subject to the approval of the
department of mental health services furnished by a community mental health center or other
mental health clinic or day care center which furnishes mental health services or (4) consulta-
tions or diagnostic or treatment sessions . ...
104. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 734-35.
105. Id. at 735.
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preemption.1 0 6 The Court first cited Shaw v. Delta Air Lines10 7 for the
broad proposition that a state law relates to an employee benefit plan
"if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan."'' 08 The Court
then reasoned that although the statute "clearly" met this test and
could be subject to preemption, 0 9 it was one that regulated insurance
by regulating the terms of insurance contracts" and, therefore, was
saved from preemption."'
The impact of Metropolitan Life was significant. It meant that the
states could regulate indirectly employee benefit plans by regulating the
terms of group policies purchased for the plans from insurance compa-
nies.1" It also meant that employees asserting claims against insurance
companies for wrongful denial of benefits could pursue causes of action
under state law, as well as those spelled out in ERISA's civil enforce-
ment provisions." 3 This is especially significant because ERISA does
not provide for the recovery of punitive damages," 4 while a suit, for
example, based on a state common-law theory for tortious breach of
contract, or based on a state statute authorizing recovery of punitive
damages, would expose insurance companies to tremendous liability
and, in some instances, provide employees with huge windfalls.
106. Id. at 744.
107. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
108. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739. The Court added that "[t]he pre-emption provision
was intended to displace all state laws that fall within its sphere, even including state laws that are
consistent with ERISA's substantive requirements." Id. (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98-99).
109. Id. at 739.
110. Id. at 740. This was common sense to the Court, and it drew ample support from the
plain language of ERISA, especially the deemer clause. In particular, the Court noted that "[b]y
exempting from the saving clause laws regulating insurance contracts that apply directly to benefit
plans, the deemer clause makes explicit Congress' intention to include laws that regulate insurance
contracts within the scope of the insurance laws preserved by the saving clause." Id. at 741. The
Court also applied the factors set forth in Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119
(1982), which were used to determine whether a particular practice constitutes the business of
insurance for the purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 742-44;
see infra notes 146-60 and accompanying text.
111. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 744.
112. Because only large companies could afford to self-insure, and many of these companies
found it easier to let an expert in the field (the insurance company) administer the employee
benefit plan, state insurance regulators could reach any employee benefit plan that was not self-
insured.
113. See ERISA, supra note 1, §§ 501-514, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1145 (1982).
114. See Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985) (holding that the
remedies provided under ERISA's civil enforcement provisions, which do not include punitive
damages, were intended to be exclusive); Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust
v. Corrigan Enterprises, Inc., 793 F.2d 1456 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that punitive damages are not
available under ERISA §§ 409(a), 502(a)(3)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987). But see
Schoenholtz v. Doniger, 657 F. Supp. 899, 913-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that ERISA's provison
for "such other equitable or remedial relief as the Court may deem appropriate" will permit the
awarding of punitive damages in certain instances (emphasis in original)).
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Metropolitan Life thus undermined one of Congress's main objec-
tives in enacting ERISA: to bring uniformity to the area of employee
benefit plans.11 Uniformity simply cannot be achieved if states are per-
mitted to regulate indirectly the terms of employee benefit plans which
provide for the purchase of group policies that may be subject to man-
dated-benefit statutes. This is a result clearly contrary to the express
intent of the drafters of ERISA.11 6 Metropolitan Life further under-
mines the objective of uniformity because, by allowing employees to sue
insurers under state law theories for denial of employee benefits, cases
would vary widely from state to state, depending on whether a state
statute or common law authorized punitive damages. This situation also
would be difficult for interstate employers because they would be faced
with a wide range of state laws with which they would have to comply.
The question then remained open, in the wake of Metropolitan
Life, as to what other state laws, in addition to mandated-benefit stat-
utes, would relate to employee benefit plans, but also would regulate
insurance and thus would be saved from preemption. The Supreme
Court again considered this question in the recent case of Pilot Life
Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.17 In Pilot Life respondent Dedeaux insti-
tuted suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Mississippi asserting the tort of bad faith and breach of contract
claims against petitioner Pilot Life for Pilot Life's failure to pay bene-
fits under a group insurance policy.' s The district court granted sum-
mary judgment for Pilot Life, finding that Dedeaux's common-law
causes of action were preempted by ERISA.119 On appeal to the Fifth
Circuit, the Court of Appeals reversed. 20 The Fifth Circuit relied heav-
ily on Metropolitan Life in finding that Dedeaux's claims were based
on state common law that regulated insurance and, therefore, were
saved from preemption.' 2 1
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed.12 2 The Court
found that Dedeaux's common-law causes of action for the tort of bad
faith and breach of contract were based on state laws that related to an
115. See supra notes 1-37 and accompanying text.
116. See ERISA, supra note 1, § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1982). The deemer
clause states that an employee benefit plan shall not be deemed to be an insurance company for
the purposes of subjecting it to state insurance regulation.
117. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
118. Id. at 43. Dedeaux was employed by Entex, Inc., which had established a long-term
disability employee benefit plan by purchasing a group insurance policy from Pilot Life. Pilot Life
had the fiduciary duty of determining who would receive benefits under the policy.
119. 1& at 44.
120. Id.
121. Id.; see Dedeaux v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 770 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1985).
122. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 57.
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employee benefit plan and thus fell within the preemptive reach of sec-
tion 514(a).123 The Court, however, disagreed with the Fifth Circuit and
held that the Mississippi common laws of bad faith and contracts did
not regulate insurance so as to be saved from preemption under section
514(b)(2)(A). 124
In its opinion the Court propounded a set of guidelines that courts
could utilize to determine whether state statutes purporting to regulate
insurance are saved from preemption. 25 The Court predictably em-
ployed the expansive definition of "relates to" in section 514(a), defin-
ing a state law which relates to an employee benefit plan as one that
has "connection with or reference to such a plan."' 26 According to the
Pilot Life Court, the Mississippi common law of bad faith and contracts
"undoubtedly" met this definition. 12 7
In turning to the question of whether the state common law regu-
lated insurance and was therefore saved from preemption under
ERISA's savings clause, the Court set forth a series of factors to be
considered. 28 The Court referred to Metropolitan Life, in which it had
ruled that mandated-benefit laws regulated insurance, and reiterated
the criteria it had employed in that case. First, the Pilot Life Court
took a common sense view of the language of the savings clause. 29 The
Court concluded that in order for a state law to be one that regulates
123. Id. at 47. The Court stated:
There is no dispute that the common law causes of action asserted in Dedeaux's complaint
"relate to" an employee benefit plan and therefore fall under ERISA's express pre-emption
clause, § 514(a). In both Metropolitan Life and Shaw v. Delta Air Lines we noted the expan-
sive sweep of the pre-emption clause. In both cases "[t]he phrase 'relate to' was given its
broad common-sense meaning, such that a state law 'relate[s] to' a benefit plan 'in the normal
sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.'" In particular we
have emphasized that the pre-emption clause is not limited to "state laws specifically
designed to affect employee benefit plans."
Id. (citations omitted) (citing Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739, quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97).
124. Id. at 50.
125. Id. at 48-49.
126. Id. at 47 (citing Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739, quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97); see
supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
127. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 48.
128. Id. at 48-49; see infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
129. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50. The Court stated:
Certainly a common-sense understanding of the phrase "regulates insurance" does not sup-
port the argument that the Mississippi law of bad faith falls under the saving clause. A com-
mon-sense view of the word "regulates" would lead to the conclusion that in order to regulate
insurance, a law must not just have an impact on the insurance industry, but must be specifi-
cally directed toward that industry. Even though the Mississippi Supreme Court has identi-
fied its law of bad faith with the insurance industry, the roots of this law are firmly planted in
the general principles of Mississippi tort and contract law. Any breach of contract, and not
merely breach of an insurance contract, may lead to liability for punitive damages under Mis-
sissippi law.
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insurance, it must not only impact on that industry, but also must be
"specifically directed toward that industry."'130 Because the Mississippi
laws of bad faith and contracts were grounded in general principles of
Mississippi tort and contract law, and were not principles specifically
applicable to the insurance industry, they did not regulate insurance
from a common sense point of view.131
The second and more probing inquiry employed by the Court was
an application of the factors defining business of insurance for the pur-
poses of the McCarran-Ferguson Act to the Mississippi law in ques-
tion.132 First, the Mississippi common law of bad faith did not affect the
spreading of policyholder risk.133 Second, although the Mississippi com-
mon law of bad faith could be said to affect the policy relationship be-
tween the insurer and the insured, the Court characterized this
connection as "attenuated at best."'34 Finally, because the Mississippi
common law of bad faith was derived from general principles of that
state's common law, it was not specifically directed towards entities
within the insurance industry.'3 5 Therefore, the Mississippi common
law of bad faith, at best, met one of the three McCarran-Ferguson crite-
ria and could not be said to regulate insurance.'36
Pilot Life thus further defined the contours of ERISA's preemption
provisions. The preemption clause itself generally will be given an ex-
pansive reading, in accordance with Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 37 mean-
ing that a wide variety of state laws conceivably could be found to
relate to an employee benefit plan.' 8 The scope of the savings clause
was narrowed by the seemingly broad holding in Metropolitan Life to
preserve only state mandated-benefit laws and, presumably, any state
statute specifically regulating the terms of an insurance contract.1'3 The
savings clause, however, does not save state laws of general applicability
that may affect incidentally the insurer-insured relationship, such as
common-law principles of contract and tort. 40 In distinguishing Metro-
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 50-51.
133. Id. at 50.
134. Id. at 51.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
138. Such laws could include mandated provider laws and freedom-of-choice laws, as well as
more extreme examples such as building permit requirements and zoning ordinances, because they
could affect the value of the plan funds or restrict in some way their use.
139. In light of this holding, mandated provider laws and freedom-of-choice laws could be
saved from preemption, while building permit requirements and zoning ordinances clearly would
not.
140. See supra note 139; infra notes 152-60 and accompanying text.
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politan Life, Pilot Life implicitly reaffirmed the notion that states may
continue to regulate indirectly employee benefit plans by regulating the
terms of group insurance policies either purchased for the plans, or
adopted by employers as the terms of their plans.
5. Present Inquiry: Business of Insurance
In the wake of Pilot Life, courts have begun to break down the
preemption inquiry into a three-step process, guided by Metropolitan
Life, Pilot Life, and the wording of section 514.141 First, a court asks
whether the state law involved is one which relates to an employee ben-
efit plan. If the state law does not relate to an employee benefit plan, it
is not preempted as stated in section 514(a). 4 If the state law clears
this hurdle, it must be tested under the savings clause. As a second step
a court asks whether the state law is one which regulates insurance. If
the statute is not found to regulate insurance, it is preempted under
section 514(a).1 43 If it is found to regulate insurance, however, a court
takes the last step and tests the state law under the deemer clause,
which states that an employee benefit plan shall not be deemed to be
an insurance company or other insurer for the purpose of the clause.
Thus, even if the state statute involved purportedly regulates insurance,
but is operating on the employee benefit plan as if that plan were an
insurance company or insurer, it still will be preempted.14 4 This ap-
proach is a sound one, amply supported by the wording of section 514
and Congress's expressed intent to preserve from preemption only those
statutes directed at insurance companies acting uniquely as insurance
companies, but not as underwriters of employee benefit plans.
The test set forth in Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno1 45
to determine whether a practice constitutes the business of insurance
for the purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act appears to be the stan-
dard courts will adopt in order to determine whether a state statute is
saved from ERISA preemption. The Supreme Court used this test in
both Metropolitan Life and Pilot Life, finding in Metropolitan Life
that the state statute involved did regulate insurance and thus was
saved,1 46 while concluding in Pilot Life that the state law did not regu-
141. ERISA, supra note 1, § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1982); see also supra notes 102-40 and
accompanying text.
142. ERISA, supra note 1, § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982). ERISA only preempts state
laws which relate to an employee benefit plan. Thus, state law which does not relate to an em-
ployee benefit plan cannot be preempted a priori by ERISA.
143. Id. § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982).
144. Id. § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1982).
145. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
146. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 744.
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late insurance and, therefore, was preempted. 14 7
The test answers the question of whether the state law is one which
regulates insurance by ascertaining how the state law comes to bear on
the business of insurance. The three criteria used are: First, whether
the practice has the effect of spreading a policyholder's risk; second,
whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship be-
tween the insurer and the insured; and finally, whether the practice is
limited to entities within the insurance industry.148 If a state law meets
all three criteria, it is likely a law that regulates insurance, while if none
of the three criteria are met, it likely is not.149 Somewhere in between
lies a "gray area" in which a court, depending on how strongly one or
more of the criteria are met, could come down on either side. Although
the Court has stated that no one factor is determinative and that the
factors should be considered together, 50 the test should provide a use-
ful framework through which an analysis can be made, and predictabil-
ity and certainty achieved, in insurance preemption cases under
ERISA.
California's Unfair Claims Practices Act"" has been a recent source
of controversy surrounding the respective scopes of ERISA's preemp-
tion and savings clauses. The Unfair Claims Practices Act sets forth a
list of unfair and deceptive insurance practices for which a private
claimant, until recently, could recover both compensatory and punitive
damages."52 Once again, the question courts currently are attempting to
147. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 49.
148. Pireno, 458 U.S. at 129; Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 48-49.
149. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
150. Pireno, 458 U.S. at 129.
151. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 (West 1972 & Supp. 1988). The California act is based on an
NAIC Model Act, the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, which, as of 1981, had been adopted
in 32 states. The analysis herein, therefore, is relevant not only for California but also for other
states in which the issue will be whether the statute regulates insurance and therefore is saved
from preemption. For an analysis of the Model Act and whether it allows a private right of action,
see Comment, The Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act: A Private Cause of Action for Third
Party Claimants Seeking Punitive Damages, 6 U. DAYTON L. Rav. 73 (1981).
152. CAL. INs. CODE § 790.03 (West 1972 & Supp. 1988). The portion of the act most often
involved in the litigation is subsection (h). The statute reads, in part
The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair and deceptive
acts or practices in the business of insurance[:]
(h) Knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a general
business practice any of the following unfair claims settlement practices:
(1) Misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to
any coverage at issue.
(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with re-
spect to claims arising under insurance policies.
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation
and processing of claims arising under insurance policies.
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address is whether the statute regulates insurance and, therefore, is
saved from preemption. 15 The consequences are important for employ-
(4) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof of
loss requirements have been completed and submitted by the insured.
(5) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of
claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.
(6) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an insurance
policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in actions brought
by such insureds, when such insureds have made claims for amounts reasonably similar to the
amounts ultimately recovered.
(7) Attempting to settle a claim by an insured for less than the amount to which a rea-
sonable man would have believed he was entitled by reference to written or printed advertis-
ing material accompanying or made part of an application.
(8) Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was altered without
notice to, or knowledge or consent of, the insured, his representative, agent, or broker.
(9) Failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or beneficiaries, upon request by
them, of the coverage under which payment has been made.
(10) Making known to insureds or claimants a practice of the insurer of appealing from
arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of compelling them to
accept settlements or compromises less than the amount awarded in arbitration.
(11) Delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured, claimant, or
the physician of either, to submit a preliminary claim report, and then requiring the subse-
quent submission of formal proof of loss forms, both of which submissions contain substan-
tially the same information.
(12) Failing to settle claims promptly, where liability has become apparent, under one
portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settlements under other por-
tions of the insurance policy coverage.
(13) Failing to provide promptly a reasonable explanation of the basis relied on in the
insurance policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for the denial of a claim or for the
offer of a compromise settlement.
(14) Directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney.
(15) Misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of limitations.
Id. As one might imagine, this laundry list of acts and omissions that imposes a "reasonableness"
standard, and utilizes such terms as "prompt," "fair," and "equitable" is a proverbial magnet for
litigation. See, e.g., Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 859 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'g
Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 607 F. Supp. 899 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Roberson v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y, 661 F. Supp. 416 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Presti v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.,
605 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Cal. 1985). In Kanne the court considered a claim under the Unfair Claims
Practices Act for wrongful denial of benefits. The district court held that the California statute was
saved from preemption. Kanne v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 607 F. Supp. 899 (C.D. Cal.
1985). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, 819 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1987), but withdrew its opin-
ion for reconsideration in light of Pilot Life. 823 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1987). The court ultimately
found the Unfair Claims Practices Act preempted by ERISA. Kanne, 859 F.2d 96, 98 (9th Cir.
1988). Under the case of Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153
Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979), claimants could assert a private right of action under § 790.03. Royal Globe
was overruled recently, however, by the California Supreme Court in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988). In light of this decision,
California claimants will no longer be able to bring a cause of action for violation of § 790.03.
153. See cases cited supra note 152. Although under Moradi-Shalal California plaintiffs can
no longer sue under § 790.03, the court stated that the Royal Globe rule allowing a private right of
action would continue to apply to cases filed prior to the Moradi-Shalal decision. Furthermore,
other states which have adopted the Model Unfair Claims Practices Act provision do recognize a
private right of action for enforcement. See, e.g., First Sec. Bank v. Goddard, 181 Mont. 407, 593
P.2d 1040 (1979); see also Comment, supra note 151, at 76-77.
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ers, insurance companies, and claimants under employee benefit plans;
if the California statute is found to be saved from preemption, punitive
damages will be available to claimants. As a consequence, employers
and insurers again will be forced to pay heed to a state regulation that
imposes obligations other than those imposed by ERISA.
Applying the business of insurance test, the California statute
would probably not clear the three Pireno hurdles. First, the statute
does not seem to be directed at the spreading of a policyholder's risk. It
imposes standards of conduct on insurers reviewing claims for benefits
under policies, but does not affect the spreading of risk, which is an
essential feature of the business of insurance. Second, one could argue
that the statute regulates the policy relationship between the insurer
and the insured. The statute does so, however, by codifying general
principles of common law such as misrepresentation, unreasonable
processing of claims, and lack of good faith. 5 " Finally, the statute is
directed at claims settlement, a practice undertaken by both private in-
surers and public pension funds. Thus, it is not targeted directly at the
insurance industry. The type of actions it makes illegal, are actions for
which a claimant already would have a cause of action in contract or in
tort, making the statute more like a codification of the common-law
principles, which were found not to regulate insurance in Pilot Life,
than a mandated-benefits statute, which was found to regulate insur-
ance in Metropolitan Life. 55
The Eleventh Circuit recently considered whether a Florida statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 624.155
(West 1984), which allowed the insured to bring a civil action against an insurer for wrongful
denial of disability benefits under an employee benefit plan group policy, was preempted by
ERISA. See Anschultz v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 850 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1988). The court
relied heavily on Pilot Life in concluding that the Florida statute was preempted. Id. at 1468-69.
154. In light of Pilot Life, therefore, courts should take a closer look at statutes that purport
to regulate insurance. If state statutes that impose reasonableness standards are treated differently
from common-law principles directed at insurers, states would be able to avoid ERISA by codify-
ing the same "law" that was found not saved from preemption in Pilot Life. A state should not be
able to avoid ERISA's preemptive reach by claiming that because the obligation imposed on the
insurer is statutorily created-rather than derived from common-law-it regulates insurance and,
therefore, is saved from preemption. To the extent that such statutes merely codify a common-law
obligation, under contract or tort theory, they should be preempted under Pilot Life. Only when
such statutes impose an obligation on an insurer beyond that required under the common law
should courts undertake the business of insurance inquiry under Pireno and Pilot Life. In some
cases, however, this analysis may not be necessary, because such statutes probably would fail the
second prong of the Pireno test.
155. The Massachusetts mandated-benefits statute is distinguished easily from both the
common law of contract and tort at issue in Pilot Life and the California Unfair Claims Practices
Act because it imposes a duty on insurers-to provide mental health coverage-that otherwise
would probably not be imposed by the common law. The Massachusetts statute would meet the
Pireno requirement that it be targeted directly at insurers, and presumably, because the Supreme
Court found it saved from preemption in Metropolitan Life, would also clear one or two of the
other Pireno hurdles. See also General Ins. Co. v. Mammoth Vista Owners Ass'n, 174 Cal. App. 3d
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The obvious benefit of the Pireno approach is that it provides a
doctrinal construct by which state laws can be tested. Rather than tak-
ing a common sense view' 56 of what constitutes insurance regulation,
the Pireno approach provides guidelines to aid courts in their determi-
nations. Furthermore, it is consistent once again with the McCarran-
Ferguson Act' 57 because the factors used in the Pireno test are the same
criteria used to define business of insurance for the purposes of that
Act. Because ERISA was drafted with the McCarran-Ferguson Act in
mind, it would be appropriate if some consistency in definition could be
achieved between the two Acts.
Unfortunately, the Pireno approach also possesses shortcomings.
There is always the strong possibility that a state law will meet one or
two of the Pireno criteria and not emerge clearly as a law that does or
does not regulate insurance. Once again the court will be forced to use
the more subjective common sense approach, 158 creating the very uncer-
tainty and lack of predictability sought to be eliminated. Courts also
could differ in their conclusions as to the application of the Pireno cri-
teria, with the worst scenario being one court finding that a state law
meets all three, while another finds that the same law fails to meet any
of the three.159 In other words, application of the criteria themselves is
a subjective inquiry, resulting once again in uncertainty.
C. Deemer Clause: Further Complications
1. Background
Prior to ERISA's enactment self-insured plans and plans that pur-
chased group insurance were treated the same. Employers who set up
employee benefit plans were subject to the same state insurance regula-
tion as entities engaged in the insurance business. 60 This meant that an
810, 822, 220 Cal. Rptr. 291, 297 (1985) (stating that § 790.03(h) is "merely a codification of the
tort of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing as applied to insurance"). But
cf. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116
(1988) (holding that there is no private right of action under § 790.03, and overruling Royal Globe
Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979)).
156. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 48 (where the Court ran the Mississippi common law of
contract and tort through the common sense test before embarking on the Pireno analysis); supra
note 129.
157. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982 & Supp. 1986); see also supra notes 78-83 and accompany-
ing text.
158. See supra notes 30 & 156.
159. This is less likely considering the recent Supreme Court pronouncements in Pilot Life
and Metropolitan Life, which if followed would provide state and lower federal courts with a great
deal of guidance. An example that comes immediately to mind, however, is a state statute that
governs how an insurance company may invest its capital. It is not far-fetched to suggest that such
a statute could clear none or as many as three of the Pireno criteria.
160. States could reach self-insured employee benefit plans under the premise that because
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employer who had employees in more than one state would have to
comply with the regulations of every state in which his employees re-
sided, or in which he conducted business. The costs of compliance with
conflicting state requirements were a great deterrent to the implemen-
tation of employee benefit plans.161 In fact, one of ERISA's primary
purposes was to bring uniformity to the area of employee benefit plans
by subjecting them to one body of federal law.6 2
Following ERISA's enactment employee benefit plans no longer
could be treated as insurers for the purpose of state insurance regula-
tions. Congress made clear its intent in the deemer clause,' which ex-
plicitly forbids a state from "deeming" an employee benefit plan to be
an insurer or insurance company for the purpose of any state law pur-
porting to regulate insurance. Thus, according to a literal reading of the
deemer clause, insurance companies that sell and often administer
group policies are subject to a full range of state regulation, while em-
ployers who fund and administer their own plans are free of state regu-
lation, even though the spreading and underwriting of risk present in
an insurance contract 64 are also present in the plan. 6 5
2. Recent Cases
The Fifth Circuit directly addressed the seemingly anomalous dis-
tinction between employee benefit plans underwritten by an insurer
and self-insured plans in Light v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala-
bama.6 6 In Light a former employee of South Central Bell sued Blue
Cross and Blue Shield under state law seeking actual and punitive dam-
ages for benefits allegedly due under the South Central Bell plan. 67
The plan was self-insured, not underwritten by Blue Cross and Blue
the plans were underwriting the spreading of employee risk, the plans were engaging in the busi-
ness of insurance and, therefore, were subject to all state insurance regulation. For a discussion of
the pros and cons of self-insuring, see Brummond, supra note 6, at 78-79.
161. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 107 S. Ct. 2211 (1987), where the Court stated:
ERISA's pre-emption provision was prompted by recognition that employers establishing and
maintaining employee benefit plans are faced with the task of coordinating complex adminis-
trative activities. A patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce considerable inefficien-
cies in benefit program operation, which might lead those employers with existing plans to
reduce benefits, and those without such plans to refrain from adopting them. Pre-emption
ensures that the administrative practices of a benefit plan will be governed by only a single
set of regulations.
Id. at 2217, cited in MacLean v. Ford Motor Co., 831 F.2d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 1987).
162. See supra notes 2-3.
163. ERISA, supra note 1, § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1982).
164. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas City v. Bell, 798 F.2d 1331, 1335 (10th Cir.
1986).
165. Id.; see also Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979).
166. 790 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1986).
167. Id. at 1247-48.
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Shield."6 8 Although he conceded that the plan was self-insured, Light
still argued that state law was saved from preemption under Metropoli-
tan Life"6 9 and Eversole v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 170 The
Fifth Circuit disagreed, saying that the distinction between a self-in-
sured plan and a plan underwritten by an insurance company or other
insurer is critical in determining whether state regulations are pre-
empted.' 7 1' Self-insured plans are free of state insurance regulation,
while plans that purchase group insurance may be regulated indirectly
by states.' 72
The absurdity of this situation is illustrated further when an at-
tempt is made to draw the line as to when an employee benefit plan is
not subject to state insurance regulation, notwithstanding the plan's as-
sociation with an insurance company. The best example is when an em-
ployer establishes a trust fund and adopts the terms of a group
insurance policy issued by an insurance company as the terms of its
plan.17 3 Technically, the plan has not purchased an insurance policy
from the insurance company-it does not pay premiums, and the in-
surer does not underwrite the spreading of risk.'7 4 Instead, the em-
ployer makes monthly contributions to the fund and claims are paid
only out of the fund, not from any of the insurance company's proceeds.
The insurance company does act, however, as the administrator of the
plan, making claims decisions on behalf of the employer. 17 5 Thus, the
insurance company is not acting as an insurer because it is not under-
writing the spreading of its policyholder's risk; it is acting, however, as a
fiduciary or administrator of the plan, making claims decisions based on
the terms of a policy with which it is familiar, because the policy is one
generally issued by that insurer.'7
168. Id. at 1247. South Central Bell and Blue Cross and Blue Shield had an agreement
whereby Blue Cross and Blue Shield was responsible for adjudicating all claims and paying all
benefits provided for under the plan. Id. This arrangement is fairly common for self-insured plans.
169. 471 U.S. at 724.
170. 500 F. Supp. 1162 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
171. Light, 790 F.2d at 1248-49 n.3.
172. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 741-42.
173. See, e.g., Moore v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 786 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1986);
Hutchinson v. Benton Casing Serv., 619 F. Supp. 831 (S.D. Miss. 1985).
174. The spreading and underwriting of the policyholder's risk is viewed as the essential fea-
ture of an insurance contract, and a company, albeit an insurance company, which is not perform-
ing such a function is not acting in the capacity of an insurer. See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v.
Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979).
175. Insurers acting in such capacities also generally defend or settle legal actions on claims
filed under the plan. Courts have held that these too are administrative functions and do not relate
to the spreading and underwriting of a policyholder's risk. See Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co., 780 F.2d 419, 423 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1170 (1986).
176. See McLaughlin v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 434, 441 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (stating that "[i]t is indisputable that where the insurance company makes final claims deci-
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The result of this distinction prescribed by the deemer clause is
that the plan cannot be reached by state regulation because it techni-
cally is self-insured. ERISA's deemer clause explicitly provides that an
employee benefit plan cannot be deemed to be an insurance company
for the purposes of state statutes regulating insurance.'77 Thus, despite
insuring its employees under a policy issued by an insurance company,
and despite the insurance company making final claims decisions, the
plan has circumvented state insurance regulation by funding the entire
plan in advance through the establishment of the trust.78
There is a caveat to what seems to be both a logical and legal ar-
rangement for avoiding the reach of state insurance regulation. Plans
which set up such a trust fund and thus self-insure, often purchase
"stop-loss" insurance from the administrator-insurer. 79 The purpose of
stop-loss insurance is to cover claim payments in the event that the
trust fund is depleted during a particular period due, for example, to a
large number of valid claims resulting from a catastrophe, such as a fire,
epidemic, or accident at the place of employment. To determine the
amount in the trust fund from which claims are to be paid, the em-
ployer and insurer calculate an average amount paid out each month in
claims and measure how much accordingly needs to be in the fund. This
could be done by taking an average based on twelve months of claims,
or by any other means which tend to guarantee that the amount in the
fund will be sufficient to cover claims, but not so great as to tie up
necessary capital. The problem arises when, for a given month, claims
exceed the amount in the fund. Stop-loss insurance provides that
should this happen, the insurance company administrator will step in
and pay those claims out of its own funds. 80 When proceeds of the
fund once again exceed claims amounts, the insurance company will be
sions under a group insurance policy issued to an employee benefit plan, ERISA governs the rela-
tionship between the insurance company and the insured").
177. ERISA, supra note 1, § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1982).
178. In this situation the plan clearly is acting like an insurer because it is spreading and
underwriting risk. It is not deemed to be an insurance company for the purpose of state regulation
of insurance. It is exactly that type of situation the deemer clause was inserted to address-states
which would attempt to regulate self-insured employee benefit plans by calling them insurers. If
not for the deemer clause, the states totally could undermine one of the primary purposes of
ERISA: the reservation of employee benefit plan regulation exclusively to the federal government.
179. See, e.g., Insurance Bd. Under the Social Ins. Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Muir,
819 F.2d 408 (3d Cir. 1987); Moore v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 786 F.2d 922 (9th Cir.
1986) (both holding that a plan that purchases stop-loss insurance is not an insured plan for the
purposes of ERISA). Contra Michigan United Food & Commercial Workers Unions v. Baerwaldt,
767 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986).
180. If claims never exceed the amount in the employer's fund, the insurer never incurs its
obligation to pay out the amounts in excess. An insurer in this situation, therefore, seems to be
acting merely as an administrator of a self-insured plan.
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reimbursed by the employer or the plan.
In this situation the insurance company is acting as more than sim-
ply an administrator of a self-insured plan. It is receiving a premium
and, in exchange, is underwriting the spreading of the plan's risk-the
risk of claims exceeding fund proceeds.181 It would appear then that
even a self-funded plan being administered by an insurance company
and adopting a group insurance policy as the terms of its plan could be
subject to state insurance regulation if the "trigger" point-the point at
which the insurance company needs to pay claims from its own
funds-is reached.182
The stop-loss caveat creates uncertainty as to whether and when
such a plan will be subject to state insurance regulation. Is the savings
clause resurrected by the mere existence of stop-loss insurance? Should
the plan be subject to state insurance regulation on a claim-by-claim
basis? Is the savings clause resurrected eternally if the trigger is
reached only once? Does triggering in a given month only subject the
plan to state insurance regulation for that particular month, or for the
plan's entire fiscal year? Is one trigger enough to subject the plan to
state insurance regulation? Does the existence of stop-loss insurance
not matter at all? The fact that there are no easy answers to these
questions indicates that perhaps the entire legal debate that has at-
tempted to draw the line between those plans that are subject to state
insurance regulation and those that are not should be ended and re-
placed by a framework that provides clarity, predictability, and ease of
administration.
Courts addressing this question should adopt the view taken by the
Ninth Circuit in United Food & Commercial Workers & Employers Ar-
izona Health & Welfare Trust v. Pacyga'8 3 and Moore v. Provident
Life & Accident Insurance Co.'8 4 The Ninth Circuit held that the exis-
tence of stop-loss insurance does not recharacterize a self-insured plan
as an insured plan, which would open the plan up to state insurance
181. The Sixth Circuit accepted this argument in Baerwaldt, 767 F.2d at 308. The Baerwaldt
court found a Michigan mandated-benefit law, similar to the one at issue in Metropolitan Life,
saved from preemption because the plans in question had purchased a stop-loss policy from an
insurance company. The court stated that "[tihe 'stop-loss' nature of the plans does not alter our
conclusion" because Metropolitan Life results in a distinction between insured and uninsured
plans and because "the plans include an arrangement whereby the plans pay premiums to [the
insurance company] to insure that [the insurance company] will pay all benefits in excess of the
claims liability limit under the group policies." Id. at 312-13.
182. Once the trigger point has been reached, the insurer has acted in the capacity of an
insurer, as well as an administrator of the plan. This situation provides the strongest argument for
the savings of state regulation directed at such insurers.
183. 801 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1986).
184. 786 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1986).
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regulation."8 5 This approach would allow employers to self-insure their
plans, while providing employers with flexibility through the purchase
of stop-loss insurance in case of unusually high claims liability for a
given period.
V. CONCLUSION
It is clear that courts have come a long way in the last decade in
untangling ERISA's preemption provisions. They have exercised pru-
dence in attempting to interpret the plain meaning of the statute's
words, supplemented with a thorough examination of the statute's leg-
islative history, in order to better ascertain Congress's intent. Perhaps
their interpretations have been in line with Congress's intentions when
drafting ERISA; some commentators would argue that congressional in-
action in the wake of judicial interpretation means exactly this. Con-
gress, however, should not hesitate to clarify the interpretation
problems that remain and legislate to correct judicial pronouncements
which are inconsistent with congressional intent. ERISA has had a posi-
tive impact in the area of employee benefits, but uncertainty about the
meaning of some of its provisions could undermine the very goals Con-
gress set out to achieve. Thus far, courts have interpreted intelligently
ERISA's preemption provision, opening up a dialogue with Congress
and constantly looking to it for guidance. Congress should be wary,
however, not to be lax and allow courts to misconstrue its intentions
and, as a consequence, frustrate Congress's objectives.
Lawrence Allen Vranka, Jr.
185. The reasoning of the court in Pacyga and Moore is both sensible and consistent with
ERISA's purpose and prior case law interpreting the statute. The Pacyga court stated:
[Stop-loss insurance] cannot be termed health insurance, nor can it be said that the Plan is
providing an insurance contract to its participants. The stop-loss coverage provides for pay-
ment to the Plan . . . to reimburse the Plan in the event that it must pay out more than a
certain amount in claims in a given year. The stop-loss insurance does not pay benefits di-
rectly to participants, nor does the insurance company take over administration of the Plan at
the point when the aggregate amount is reached. Thus, no insurance is provided to the par-
ticipants, and the Plan should properly be termed a non-insured plan....
801 F.2d at 1161-62.
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